Volume 25

Issue 1

Article 11

November 1917

Measure of Damages for Breach of Implied Covenants in Oil and
Gas Lease to Develop and Protect From Drainage
J. W. S.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
J. W. S., Measure of Damages for Breach of Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Lease to Develop and
Protect From Drainage, 25 W. Va. L. Rev. (1917).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss1/11

This Editorial Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

S.: Measure of Damages for Breach of Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
EDITORIAL NOTES
ME.ASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANTS IN OIL

AND GAS LEASE TO DEVELOP AND PROTECT FROM DRAINAGE. -

After

the discovery of oil by the lessee under an oil and gas lease by
the terms of which the compensation of the lessor is to be a share
of the oil produced, in the absence of an express covenant as to
further development of the premises, the courts will imply a
covenant on the part of the lessee to protect the lines of the leased
premises from drainage by wells on near-by lands, and will also
imply a covenant to develop the leasehold with reasonable diligence for the mutual benefit of both parties.' In case of the breach
of either of these covenants it has often been said that the lessor
has an action for damages2 though the cases are few where a lessor
has attempted to recover such damages.. In the cases which have
been decided by courts of last resort the question as to the proper
measure of damages for breach of these covenants has proved
troublesome.
another company, an interstate commerce transaction? It is of course beyond the
scope of this note to do more than briefly point out the line of argument. There is
an interstate transportation of an ordinary article of commerce by one person for
another, under an agreement by which a service is to be performed upon that
article in another state for another person. Why isn't that interstate commerce?
If there had been a sale of the article by the Torpedo Co. to the Oil Co. and then
such an interstate transportation by the former for the latter it would clearly be
interstate commerce.
See 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION, § 302; PRENTICE AND
EGAN, THE Comhss RCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 43 et seq; JUDSON,
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S ed. § 7. But the actual, practical effect of the transaction
is the same as If there had been a technical sale. Besides, a sale of the thing
transported between states is not necessary to constitute an interstate commerce
transaction. Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1. See
also International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. Ed. 678, 27 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 493, where the court, quoting with approval from the last named case, says :
"all interstate commerce is not salds of goods. Importation into one state from
another is the indispensable element, the test, of interstate commerce, and every
negotiation, contract, trade and dealing between citizens of different states which
contemplates and causes such importation, whether it be goods, persons, or Information, Is a transaction of interstate commerce."
See also to the same effect City
of Kansas City v. Seaman, 99 Kan. 143, 160 Pac. 1139, L. R. A. 1917B 341.
1 Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801; Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84
N. E. 46; Ulrey v. Keith, 237 I1. 284, 86 N. E. 696; Culbertson v. Iola Portland
Cement Co.. 87 Kan. 529, 125 Pac. 81; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 0. St. 118, 48
N. E. 502; Coffinberry v. Sun Oil Co., 68 0. St. 488, 67 N E. 1069; Indiana Oil,
Gas & Development Co. v. McCrory, 42 Okla. 136, 140 Pac. 610; McGraw Oil Co.
v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027; Hall v. South Penn Oil Co., 71 W. Va.
82, 76 S. E. 124.
2
Doddridge County Oil & Gas Co. v. Smith, 154 Fed. 970; Brewster v. Lanyon
Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801; Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill., 56 N. E. 46; Carrv. Huntington Light
& Fuel Co., 33 Ind. App. 1, 70 N. E. 552; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 0. St. 118, 48
N. E. 502; Ammons v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 610, 35 S. E. 1004; Jennings
v. Southern Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215, 80 S. E. 368; Phillips v. Hamilton, 17
Wyo. 41, 95 Pac. 846.
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On principle, if an action is brought for breach of the implied
covenant to protect the leased land from drainage by drilling wells
to offset those on other property near enough to drain the leasehold, the plaintiff ought to recover what he has lost by such breach,
that is, the value of the oil he would have received had the covenant been performed by the lessee. In Kleppner v. Lemon,3 recovery was allowed on substantially this basis. This seems to be
the only case decided by a court of last resort where damages
have been allowed for breach of covenant to protect the leased
land from drainage of oil. The question recently arose in West
Virginia in the case of Steele v. American Oil Development Co,"
but as the case was reversed on other grounds, the court did not
discuss the proper measure of damages. However, throughout the
opinion it appears to assume the rule of damages suggested would
be correct.
Clearly the lessor ought to have a remedy for breach of this implied covenant. It is quite certain the oil drained from the land
is not replaced to any great extent by inflowing oil from adjoining
territory, particularly where, as in many cases, wells are operated
on all sides of a leasehold. There is, therefore, truly a substantial
loss to the lessor. It may be difficult to prove the extent of the
drainage with sufficient definiteness to sustain a verdict for damages but it would seem a skilful lawyer should be able to secure
and introduce evidence upon which a jury could make at least
as accurate a guess as to the amount of damages as they can make
from the evidence commonly before them in a great number of
other cases. The court should only require the best evidence that
can be produced and this should be sufficient if it fairly tends to
support the verdict.5
In at least two cases damages have been allowed for breach of
the covenant to develop the premises reasonably. In Bradford
Oil Co. v. Blair, supra, the lease contained an express covenant
to develop the leasehold and damages were allowed for its breach.
It would seem the same measure of damages should be applied
whether the covenant be express or implied. The jury was directed to find how much more oil the plaintiff ought to have received than he did receive, its value, and from such value deduct
S197 Pa. St. 430, 47 AtI. 353 ; on rehearing 198 Pa. St. 581, 48 AUt. 483.
'92 S. W. 410 (W. Va. 1917).
But see Duffield v. Rosenzweig, 144 Pa. St. 520, 23 A. 4.
6
Bradford Oil Co. w. Blair, 113 Pa. St. 83, 4 At. 218; Daughetee v. Ohio Oil
Co., 151 IMl. App. 107, 181 Ill. App. 135; affirmed 263 Ill. 518, 105 N. E. 308.
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the cost of producing what he ought to have received at the time
and under the circumstances and with the appliances then known
and upon such balance allow interest. Why the cost of production should be deducted is hard to perceive since the lessor was
entitled to one eighth of the oil and apparently did not bear any
of the cost of production. Perhaps the court thought that since
the original lease had been forfeited in this case, the lessor himself would be compelled to put down wells to get the oil beneath
his land, and hence would have to bear the cost of production.
This seems unsound for if he did so he would get all the oil instead of a royalty and if the amount of oil was considerable he
could make another lesse. In Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., supra,
the action was for breach of an implied covenant to develop. The
court approved an instruction which in substance said that in arriving at a verdict the jury should subtract from the quantity of
oil which they found should have been produced from the premises
during the period stated, the quantity actually produced and
saved, and allow the plaintiff one eighth the value of the difference at the market price during the period in question. In Guffey
Petroleum Go. v. Jeff Chaison Townsite Go.,7 the lower court applied a similar rule of damages but on appeal the case was reversed
without consideration of the measure of damages.
It is submitted that the measure of damages applied in these
cases is not sound because the result is to give to the lessor the
value of his share of the oil that ought to have been produced by
the lessee, though the oil is not lost as in the case of drainage, but
is still beneath his land and may subsequently be produced and
turned over to the lessor by way of royalty, either under the
original or under a subsequent lease. It is true that oil is of a
vagrant character but in the absence of drainage it is reasonable
to presume that approximately the same amount of oil remains
under. the land at all times even if not made up of the same molecules. This objection to the measure of damages was pointed out
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Grass v.
Big Greek Development Co., 8 where the court said of the lessors:
"So far as disclosed, they have lost nothing more than interest on
the value of productions obtainable had defendant exercised that
degree of diligence we have suggested as due under certain conditions and circumstances."
Judge Poffenbarger in his con7 48

Tex. Clv. App. 555, 107 S. W. 609.

8 75 W. Va. 719, 732, 84 S. U. 750.
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curring opinion insisted that no right of action whatever should
be allowed in such a case. If such a covenant is implied then
it is submitted on its breach there is no substantial damage capable
of proof except the loss of interest on the money the lessor should.
have received from the sale of his share of the oil.
Where leased land contains gas but no oil or where part of eack
are produced and saved, there may be some difference in the measure of damages so far as the gas is concerned. If a lease provides
for payment of a royalty on the amount of gas taken from the
premises, then the rule of damages for breach of an implied covenant to protect from drainage should be similar to that applied
where there is a breach of covenant to protect from drainage of
oil and one case has so held? Most leases provide for the payment
of a fixed yearly sum for each gas well. This would simply relieve
the jury from the duty of determining how much gas should have
been produced by the lessee. However, the jury would have to
find, not how much gas had thus been lost by drainage, but how
many wells the lessor should have drilled and how many years'
rental was lost because of the lessee's breach. In case of an implied covenant to develop the premises diligently it would not be
easy in most cases to prove a breach of the covenant since a lessee
is not bound to put down many wells to develop for gas,10 the
drainage being from a great area and if wells are close together
the lives of such wells are very much shortened. No case has been
found where damages have been allowed for such a breach, but in
Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.," the court stated the damages would be the sum the plaintiff has lost or may lose by the
failure of the defendant to complete the number of producing
wells reasonably necessary to develop the resources of the leased
land and to protect its lines. It seems the court meant he was
entitled to the sum fixed per year for each year the wells that
ought to have been drilled produced gas in paying quantities. If
so, in so far as there was no drainage the same objection can be
made here as was made above in the case of breach of covenant
to develop for oil. The lessor would lose only the use of the money
he should have received.
-J. W. S.
9 Culbertson v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 87 Kan. 529, 125 Pac. 81.
10 McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027.
u 82 Kan. 367, 108 Pac. 813.
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